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Creativity is one of the most important assets we have to navigate through the fast
changing world of the 21st century. Anecdotal accounts of creative individuals suggest
that oftentimes, creative discoveries result from a process whereby initial conscious
thought is followed by a period during which one refrains from task-related conscious
thought. For example, one may spend an embarrassing amount of time thinking about
a problem when the solution suddenly pops into consciousness while taking a shower.
Not only creative individuals but also traditional theories of creativity have put a lot of
emphasis on this incubation stage in creative thinking. The aim of the present article
is twofold. First, an overview of the domain of incubation and creativity is provided by
reviewing and discussing studies on incubation, mind-wandering, and sleep. Second, the
causes of incubation effects are discussed. Previously, little attention has been paid to
the causes of incubation effects and most findings do not really speak to whether the
effects should be explained by unconscious processes or merely by consequences of a
period of distraction. In the latter case, there is no need to assume active unconscious
processes. The findings discussed in the current article support the idea that it is not
merely the absence of conscious thought that drives incubation effects, but that during an
incubation period unconscious processes contribute to creative thinking. Finally, practical
implications and directions for future research will be discussed.
Keywords: creativity, problem solving, incubation, mind wandering, sleep, unconscious processes
Important achievements in the arts and sciences depend on cre-
ativity (Feist and Gorman, 1998; Kaufman, 2002), and creativity is
associated with the development of new social institutions (Bass,
1990; Mumford, 2002) and economic growth (Amabile, 1997;
Simonton, 1999). It is generally accepted that a creative idea or
a creative solution to a problem has to be novel (i.e., original)
and useful (Amabile, 1983; Runco and Pritzker, 1999). Creativity
is not limited to the realms of greatness, but can also be found
in daily life, for example, when one has to accomplish a task in a
new way (Cropley, 1990) or when one has to adapt to changes
(Runco, 2004). Today’s world of continuous change thrives on
creative individuals. Creativity has been related to cognitive abili-
ties, expertise, and practice (Patrick, 1986; Amabile, 1996; Runco,
2004; Ericsson, 2006; Sawyer, 2012), and one may expect that cre-
ativity mainly thrives on extensive conscious thought. However,
creative individuals, in describing their work habits or the process
of creative problem solving, have suggested that oftentimes, cre-
ative ideas result from a period of incubation—a process whereby
initial conscious thought is followed by a period during which
one refrains from task-related conscious thought (for anecdotal
accounts, see Ghiselin, 1952). The most frequently cited anecdote
is probably the one from the mathematician Poincaré:
“[. . .] I left Caen, where I was living, to go on a geologic excursion
under the auspices of the School of Mines. The incidents of the
travel made me forget my mathematical work. Having reached
Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go some place or other.
At the moment when I put my foot on the step, the idea came
to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have
paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used to define
the Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidian
geometry. I did not verify the idea; I should not have had the
time, as, upon taking my seat in the omnibus, I went on with a
conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect certainty. On
my return to Caen, for conscience’ sake, I verified the result at my
leisure.” (Poincaré quoted in Hadamard, 1945, p. 13).
In addition, several famous anecdotes suggest that sleep facil-
itates creativity, ranging from musical compositions to scientific
insights (Mazzarello, 2000). In speaking of the attainment of
solutions, “Beatle” Paul McCartney announced that he came up
with the melody for “Yesterday” in a dream, and the Nobel Prize
winner Loewi woke up with the idea for how to experimentally
prove his theory of chemical neurotransmission. The idea that
a period of incubation might facilitate creativity has not only
been suggested by creative minds, but has also been stressed
in creativity models. Wallas (1926) proposed that the creative
process entails four stages: Preparation (acquisition of knowledge
to some task), Incubation (process that occurs when conscious
attention is diverted away from the task), Illumination (creative
idea flashes into sight), and Verification (creative idea is subjected
to evaluation). Certainly a creative idea may be found before a
decrease in conscious effort, that is, before the Incubation stage.
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Sometimes, however, a period of incubation seems to precede
creative breakthroughs as illustrated above for several scientific
discoveries and artistic compositions. Sparked by the anecdotal
accounts on incubation and creativity, various attempts have
been made to investigate incubation effects. As demonstrated
by a Google Scholar search (Sio and Ormerod, 2009), with the
search restricted to the years 1997–2007 and the subject areas to
social sciences, arts, and humanities, the term incubation along
with either creativity, insight, or problem, yielded more than 5000
articles. Empirical research has shown that a period of incubation
indeed helps creativity (Dodds et al., 2003; Sio and Ormerod,
2009).
However, it is not yet clear why incubation is helpful. The
moderators discovered thus far do not really speak to whether the
effects should be explained by unconscious processes or merely by
other consequences of a period of distraction (e.g., relaxation, for-
getting of fixating elements, mental set-shifting) without the need
to assume active unconscious processes (see also Orlet, 2008). The
aim of the current article is to provide an overview of the domain
of incubation and creativity, and to review and discuss findings
that speak to whether during an incubation period unconscious
processes contribute to creative thinking, or whether it is merely
the absence of conscious thought that drives creativity. Finally,
practical implications and directions for future research will be
discussed.
INCUBATION
Many anecdotal accounts and traditional theories of creativity
have put emphasis on incubation. The basic phenomenon is a
familiar one: we are working on a problem, we can’t solve the
task, we leave it aside for some period of time—the incubation
period—and when we return attention to the task we have some
new insight that helps us to solve the problem. In general, there are
two frequently used methods to conduct incubation experiments.
In the “interpolated activity” method, participants work on a task
or problem for a period of time, are then given an incubation
period, and finally return to the task. Participants’ performance is
compared with that of a control group of people who worked on
the same problem continuously. In the “multiple trial or multiple
item” method, multiple tasks or problems are presented and,
afterwards, items that have not been solved are re-administered.
For example, participants work for one minute apiece on several
problems. Then, the unsolved problems are re-administered for
one minute apiece. It is presumed that the time between the first
and second encounter with the tasks or problems allows incuba-
tion to occur. Some researchers using this approach also insert
an incubation period between the first and second encounter
with the problems. For example, after the first encounter with
the problems participants perform a distractor task and after this
incubation interval return to work for a certain time on problems
that they did not solve. Participants’ performance is compared
with that of a control group, and if a within-participant design
is used, the increase in number of problems is used.
Whereas some studies reported strong incubation effects (e.g.,
Kaplan, 1989; Smith and Blankenship, 1989; Smith and Dodds,
1999; Dodds et al., 2003), others have failed to find any effects at
all (e.g., Olton and Johnson, 1976). To resolve the uncertainties
surrounding incubation effects, Dodds et al. (2003) conducted
a review of experimental literature on incubation in problem
solving and creativity, and revealed that 29 out of 39 experi-
ments have found a significant effect of incubation. The authors
suggested that incubation length and preparatory activities can
increase incubation effects. Moreover, the authors demonstrated
that presenting a clue during the incubation period can either
have strong positive (if the clue is useful) or negative effects (if
the clue is misleading). For example, “ocean” or “floor” could
be a misleading clue when trying to find a fourth word that
functions as an associative link between the three items “ship,
outer, crawl”, whereas “space” could be a useful clue. Sio and
Ormerod (2009) conducted a statistical meta-analytic review
of empirical studies of incubation. In their meta-analysis 117
independent studies were included, and the contributions of
moderators such as problem type, presence of cues, and lengths
of preparation and incubation periods were investigated. Over-
all, a positive incubation effect was found. In a recent study,
Gilhooly et al. (2013) investigated interactions between the type
of creativity task (verbal or spatial) and the type of incubation
activity (verbal or spatial) on creative performance. Experimental
groups, after 5 min of conscious work on a verbal creativity
task (Alternative Uses Task) or a spatial creativity task (Mental
Synthesis), had a 5-min incubation period that involved either
spatial (Mental Rotation) or verbal (Anagrams) tasks. Following
incubation, participants resumed their main task for a further
5 min. Control groups undertook Alternative Uses or Mental
Synthesis for 10 min without any incubation periods. Significant
incubation effects were found overall and there were interac-
tions in that spatial incubation benefited verbal fluency and
verbal-rated creativity, and verbal incubation benefited spatial-
task fluency and spatial-rated creativity but not vice versa. These
findings suggest that an interpolated incubation activity of a
dissimilar nature to the target task leads to stronger effects of
incubation as compared to an interpolated activity similar to the
target task.
Not only the task that is performed during an incubation
period, but also the time interval of an incubation period can
vary. It can vary from a few moments or a night of sleep
through days or weeks away from the problem. An example of
a relatively short incubation period is mind-wandering—a state
of mind that occurs spontaneously, and largely autonomously,
whenever an awake individual is not engaged in a cognitively
demanding task. Research on mind-wandering has a long his-
tory, and was recently popularized by Smallwood et al. (2003)
who used thought sampling and questionnaires to investigate
mind-wandering. In past and recent literature, alternative names
to the term mind-wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Mason et al., 2007) have been used, such as “day dreaming”
(Giambra, 1979), “spontaneous thought” (Christoff et al., 2011),
“task-unrelated thought” (Giambra and Grodsky, 1989; Small-
wood et al., 2003), and “stimulus independent thought” (Teas-
dale et al., 1995). In a recent study, Baird et al. (2012) exam-
ined whether creative performance was facilitated differentially
by engaging in mind-wandering (i.e., a 0-back task, an unde-
manding task without memory load that has been shown to
elicit mind-wandering, Smallwood et al., 2009), a demanding
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task (i.e., a 1-back working memory task), a rest period, or no
break between creativity problems. To measure creative perfor-
mance, the Unusual Uses Task (a task that requires participants
to generate as many unusual uses as possible for a common
object) was used. All participants performed two Unusual Uses
Task problems (2 min per problem) to measure baseline creative
performance. Subsequently, participants were assigned to one
of the four between-subjects conditions. After the incubation
interval (or following the baseline measure, in the case of the
no-break condition), participants worked on the Unusual Uses
Task again. Four problems (2 min per problem) were presented
in a random order: two problems that were identical to the
problems presented at baseline and two new problems. Engag-
ing in an undemanding task during an incubation period led
to significant increases in creative solutions to the target prob-
lems as compared to the demanding task, rest, and no break
conditions. This improvement was observed only for repeated-
exposure problems, which demonstrates that it resulted from
an incubation process rather than a general increase in creative
problem solving. The unrelated thoughts that occur during mind
wandering uniquely seem to facilitate incubation. According to
Baird et al., one possible explanation may be that mind wan-
dering enhances creativity by increasing unconscious associative
processing, as predicted by the spreading-activation account of
incubation (e.g., Yaniv and Meyer, 1987; Dijksterhuis and Meurs,
2006).
In recent years, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) research has been used to focus on understanding how
the brain generates the spontaneous and relatively unconstrained
thoughts that are experienced when the mind wanders. One
candidate neural mechanism for mind-wandering is a network
of regions in the frontal and parietal cortex known as the default
mode network (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). The
default mode network, also called the default network, default
state network, or task-negative network, is defined as a set of inter-
connected brain regions including the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and lateral and medial
temporal lobes (Spreng et al., 2010). It is a brain system that is
especially active when an individual is not focused on the outside
world (Buckner et al., 2008) and when cognitive control is low
(Andreasen, 1995). Moreover, it has been related to complex, eval-
uative and unconscious forms of information processing (Vincent
et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2010), and it contrasts with the cognitive
control network (Fox et al., 2005)—a set of brain regions includ-
ing the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), inferior frontal junction (IFJ), anterior insular
cortex (AIC), dorsal pre-motor cortex (dPMC), and posterior
parietal cortex (PPC; Cole and Schneider, 2007). Indeed, when
one network is activated, the other is deactivated (Fox et al.,
2005). In addition to these findings, structural MRI research has
provided a first indication that the default mode network may
be involved in creativity. Jung et al. (2010) have linked cortical
thickness measures to psychometric measures of creativity and
found a negative correlation between creative performance and
activity in the lingual gyrus and a positive correlation between
creative performance and grey matter volume in the right PCC,
a brain area that is part of the default mode network.
In a recent structural MRI study, Kühn et al. (2013) provided
further support for the involvement of the default mode network
in creativity. Participants performed a well-established creativity
task by which a participant’s cognitive flexibility and the average
uniqueness and average creativity of a participant’s ideas were
assessed. For all psychometric measures of creativity a positive
correlation was observed between inter-individual differences in
creative performance and inter-individual differences in volume
of the default mode network. Based on these findings, it can be
assumed that greater volume in the default mode network (i.e., in
the counterpart of the cognitive control network) provides more
neural resources for generating creative ideas. These findings
suggest that less controlled processes such as mind-wandering are
important in creativity. One relatively controversial finding is that
periods of mind-wandering are associated with increased activa-
tion in both the default and executive system, a result that implies
that mind-wandering may often be goal oriented (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood et al., 2009). Apart from studies
about the default mode network, there are several important other
studies on neuroimaging and creativity. For example, the research
from Reverberi et al. (2005) demonstrates that the lateral frontal
cortex impairs problem solving, and the research by Kounios
and Jung-Beeman (2009) on the cognitive neuroscience of insight
suggests that insight is the culmination of a series of brain states
and processes operating at different time scales. Recently, Dietrich
and Kanso (2010) reviewed 72 neuroimaging studies on creativity
and insight and concluded that the neuroscientific literature on
creativity, thus far, is self-contradicting and that creative thinking
does not appear to critically depend on any single mental pro-
cess or brain region. The default mode network can, therefore,
be considered one, but not the single neural underpinning of
creativity.
Whereas mind-wandering can be considered a relatively short
incubation period, sleep can be considered an incubation period
that covers a longer period of time. Sleep is divided into two broad
types, rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and non-rapid eye move-
ment (NREM) sleep. Each type has a distinct set of associated
physiological and neurological features. REM sleep is a stage of
sleep characterized by the rapid and random movement of the
eyes, and typically occupies 20–25% of total sleep. During REM,
the activity of the brain’s neurons is quite similar to that during
waking hours and subjects’ vividly recalled dreams mostly occur
during REM sleep. Unlike REM sleep, during NREM sleep there
is usually little or no eye movement and dreaming is rare. The
differences in the REM and NREM activity reported is believed
to arise from differences in the memory stages that happen
during the two methods of sleep (Manni, 2005). For example,
Stickgold et al. (1999) have shown that cognition during REM
sleep is qualitatively different from that of waking and NREM
sleep, and may reflect a shift in associative memory systems. They
suggest that this shift in cognitive processing is responsible, in
large part, for the bizarre nature of dreams and may serve to
enhance the strength of associations between weakly associated
memories, an important skill underlying creative thinking. The
mental activity that takes place during NREM sleep is believed
to be thought-like, whereas REM sleep includes hallucinatory
and bizarre content (Manni, 2005). Thus far, sleep research has
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mainly been focused on memory performance. A prominent
finding is that sleep, and certain stages of sleep in particular, are
important in memory processing, resulting in delayed learning
without the need for further practice or task engagement (Stick-
gold et al., 2001). These findings of sleep-dependent learning
are now strongly supported by cellular and molecular evidence
of sleep-dependent plasticity across a broad range of phylogeny
(Bennington and Frank, 2003). Yet memory consolidation is only
one of many cognitive virtues possessed by the human brain,
another is creativity.
The link between creativity and sleep, especially dreaming,
has long been a topic of intense speculation (Stickgold and
Walker, 2004). In recent years, the facilitatory effect of sleep
on creativity has also received empirical support. Research from
Barrett (1993) has shown that college students incubated answers
to real-life homework and other objective problems on which
they were working, finding that in one week’s time, half of the
students had dreamed about their topic and 25% had a dream
that provided an answer. Barrett (2001) also interviewed modern
artists and scientists (including Nobel Prizes winners) about
their use of their dreams and concluded that while anything—
math, musical composition, business dilemmas—may get solved
during dreaming, the two areas dreams are especially likely to
help are anything where vivid visualization contributes to the
solution and any problem where the solution lies in thinking
outside the box—i.e., where the person is stuck because the
conventional wisdom on how to approach the problem is wrong.
Moreover, in an experimental study Wagner et al. (2004) have
shown that sleep inspires creative insight. Subjects completed a
number reduction task, and each numerical sequence could be
completed in a slow, stepwise way, but the trials could also be
completed according to a hidden, more abstract rule that would
speed up participants’ responses. The initial training was followed
by 8 h of nighttime sleep, nighttime wakefulness, or daytime
wakefulness. Of the people who slept before they resumed, almost
60% discovered the rule, as opposed to 23% of the people
in the two groups that did not sleep. Thus, participants who
got several hours of sleep were more than two times as likely
during retesting to gain insight into a hidden rule built into
the task.
In addition, sleep has been shown to enhance important
aspects of creativity, including cognitive flexibility and the ability
to find remote associations. In a study on cognitive flexibility
across the sleep-wake cycle, Walker et al. (2002) found that when
woken from REM sleep, participants had a 32% advantage in the
number of anagrams solved compared with NREM awakenings,
which were equal to that of wake time performance. These find-
ings suggest that REM sleep may offer a different mode of problem
solving compared with wake and NREM. The authors hypothe-
sized that REM sleep is highly conducive to fluid reasoning and
flexible thought due to the lack of aminergic dominance in REM
sleep. In a study on the ability to find remote associations, Sio
et al. (2012) participants were presented with a set of Remote
Associates Test (RAT) items. Each RAT item contains a triplet of
words presented horizontally along with a blank space. For each
item, the participant has to find a fourth word that functions
as an associative link between these three words (e.g., cookies,
sixteen, heart: . . . . . . . . .; the answer to this item is sweet: cookies
are sweet, sweet sixteen, sweetheart). Reaching a solution requires
creative thought as the first, most probable associate to each of
the items is often not correct, so the participant must think of
more remote associations (i.e., distantly related information) to
connect the three words. In the current study the RAT items
varied in difficulty as a function of the strength of the stimuli–
answer associations. After a period of sleep, wake, or no delay,
participants reattempted earlier unsolved problems. The sleep
group solved a greater number of difficult RAT items than did
the other groups, but no difference was found for easier RAT
items. These findings suggest that sleep facilitates creative think-
ing for harder problems. While evidence for the role of sleep in
creative problem-solving has been looked at by prior research,
underlying mechanisms such as different stages of sleep had
not been explored. Cai et al. (2009) used the RAT, and tested
participants in the morning, and again in the afternoon, after
either a nap with REM sleep, one without REM or a quiet rest
period. Participants grouped by REM sleep, non-REM sleep and
quiet rest were indistinguishable on measures of memory. Most
importantly, although the quiet rest and NREM sleep groups
received the same prior exposure to the task, they displayed no
improvement on the RAT test, whereas the REM sleep group
improved by almost 40% over their earlier performances. The
authors hypothesized that the formation of associative networks
from previously unassociated information in the brain, leading to
creative problem-solving, is facilitated by changes to neurotrans-
mitter systems during REM sleep. Thus, REM sleep is assumed to
enhance the integration of unassociated information for creative
problem solving.
To recap, various attempts have been made to investigate
incubation effects in creativity and creative problem solving. The
conclusion of the literature is that overall, a positive incubation
effect can be observed. Especially the work by Dodds et al. (2003)
and Sio and Ormerod (2009), who conducted reviews of empirical
studies of incubation, justify the conclusion that incubation can
enhance creative performance. This is also supported by research
on mind-wandering and sleep, which can be seen as short and
relatively long periods of incubation. However, the process(es)
underlying incubation effects remain unclear. In the next section,
we aim to shed light on the question whether during an incuba-
tion period unconscious processes contribute to creative thinking,
or whether it is merely the absence of conscious thought that
drives incubation effects.
MECHANISMS UNDERLYING INCUBATION EFFECTS
Whereas the effects of incubation are generally accepted (Sio
and Ormerod, 2009), its causes are controversial. The main
debate between different theories is about whether during an
incubation period unconscious processes contribute to creative
thinking (unconscious work theory), or whether it is merely the
absence of conscious thought that drives creativity (conscious
work theory). Historically, incubation effects refer to the idea
that setting a problem aside for a while helps creative thought
and problem solving as unconscious processes are working on the
problem while the individual is not consciously thinking about
the problem (see Wallas, 1926, as well as, e.g., Hadamard, 1945;
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Kris, 1952; Rugg, 1963; Kubie, 1985). That is, the unconscious
actively thinks and contributes to solving a problem (see also
Koestler, 1964; Claxton, 1997). In contrast, conscious work the-
ories have ascribed incubation effects on creative performance
to relaxation (being well-rested, one can do better the next
time one engages in the problem; Helmholtz, 1896; Woodworth
and Schlosberg, 1954) and to the effects of facilitating cues
from the environment (environmental cues trigger retrieval of
previously un-retrieved relevant information; e.g., Yaniv and
Meyer, 1987; Langley and Jones, 1988). Moreover, sometimes
old and inappropriate ideas can cause mental fixation, imped-
ing the generation of new and appropriate ideas (Smith, 2003).
Therefore, in addition to relaxation and facilitating cues, it has
been suggested that incubation effects can lead to forgetting of
fixating elements (Smith and Blankenship, 1989; Segal, 2004)
and to mental set-shifting (wrong cues become less accessible,
leading to a fresh, new and unbiased start; Schooler and Melcher,
1995).
Recently, Gupta et al. (2012) investigated whether high-
frequency candidate answers should be avoided in order to find
creative solutions in for instance a RAT. They tested individual
differences in creativity as measured with a complex problem-
solving task, and developed a computational model of the RAT.
Findings showed that individuals performed poorly on the RAT
when they were biased to consider high-frequency candidate
answers. Storm and Angelo (2010) investigated whether inhibi-
tion may facilitate creative problem solving by providing a mech-
anism by which to bypass fixation. They measured participants’
retrieval-induced forgetting and, thereafter, participants had to
solve RAT problems. Half of the participants were exposed to
misleading associates prior to problem solving (fixation condi-
tion) and half were not (baseline condition). Correlating the
retrieval-induced forgetting measure with performance on the
RAT revealed that the propensity to inhibit irrelevant information
comes at a price, as potentially relevant information may be
inhibited. However, inhibition can also provide a means by which
to overcome fixation and, thereby, facilitate creativity. There is
no denying that a period of distraction allows for forgetting of
fixation and/or mental set-shifting, relaxation, and exposure to
environmental cues, and that these effects can contribute to cre-
ative thoughts or problem solving. However, it can be questioned
whether these effects are the only benefit of an incubation period,
or whether during an incubation period unconscious processes
contribute to creative thinking.1
Research from Bowers et al. (1990) suggests that the uncon-
scious is able to “close in” on the correct answer some time before
the answer is accessible to consciousness. They asked participants
to find a target word while they were given successive hints, such
as an associated word. Individuals felt clueless for some time
and then suddenly came up with the correct answer. However,
analysing the prior guesses revealed that individuals were slowly
getting closer to the right solution before the solution reached
consciousness. Participants’ successive guesses, thus, converged
towards the correct answer. Moreover, a study conducted by
1Note that the section below greatly overlaps with Dijksterhuis (submitted for
publication).
Betsch et al. (2001) demonstrated that people can unconsciously
integrate large amounts of information. Participants watched
TV ads shown on a computer screen and simultaneously the
numerical increases and decreases of hypothetical shares were
shown at the bottom of the screen. Participants could not cor-
rectly answer specific questions about the shares, but they had
developed a liking or disliking towards each of the shares. These
findings suggest that participants processed and integrated the
information while they were attending to the TV ads. Recently,
Ric and Muller (2012) have shown that people can unconsciously
initiate and follow arithmetic rules, such as addition. In several
studies participants were instructed to detect whether a symbol
was a digit, and this symbol was preceded by two digits and a
subliminal instruction (i.e., the “add” instruction or a control
instruction). Participants were faster at identifying a symbol as
a number when the symbol was equal to the sum of the two digits
and they received the instruction to add the digits. In line with
these findings, Sklar et al. (2012) demonstrated that presenting
participants with additions or subtractions subliminally leads to
higher accessibility of correct answers (i.e., answers could be ver-
balized faster) than incorrect answers. A recent review on uncon-
scious higher-order cognition conducted by Van Gaal et al. (2012)
revealed strong evidence for unconscious response-inhibition,
conflict resolution, as well as for error detection. Importantly, they
also concluded that people can unconsciously integrate multiple
pieces of information across space and time.To resume, evidence
from various research areas demonstrates that processes that we
consider thought processes can ensue unconsciously. This makes
it reasonable to assume that thought processes in the service of
creativity and problem solving can, in principle at least, also take
place unconsciously.
The idea that during an incubation period unconscious pro-
cesses are active was one of the building blocks of Unconscious
Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Uncon-
scious thought, that is, “deliberation in the absence of conscious
attention directed at the problem,” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006,
p.1005) has mainly been studied in the context of decision-
making (Strick et al., 2011; see also Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,
2006; Bargh, 2011; Nieuwenstein and van Rijn, 2012). In the
literature on unconscious thought in decision-making, partici-
pants are typically first presented with information pertaining
to a decision. Thereafter, they are distracted for a while, before
they make a decision. For example, Bos et al. (2008) compared
participants decision performance after three conditions, a con-
scious thought condition and two incubation conditions, that
is, an unconscious thought condition and a mere distraction
condition. Whereas participants in the unconscious thought con-
dition were told that they would engage in an unrelated task
before returning to the actual task, participants in the mere
distraction condition were told that they had finished the task
and would move on to unrelated tasks. In the mere distraction
condition participants were, thus, distracted just as in the uncon-
scious thought condition, but did not have a problem-solving
goal. A period of distraction only improved decision-making in
the unconscious thought condition, that is, when participants
expected to make a decision following the distraction period.
Comparing an unconscious thought condition with a mere
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distraction condition provides evidence for true, active thought
taking place unconsciously. Given the evidence for unconscious
thought processes that we have from multiple research areas (e.g.,
decision making, lie detection), the question raises whether there
is also evidence for unconscious thought effects in the domain of
creativity.
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) investigated the relation
between different thought processes and the generation of cre-
ative ideas. In several experiments participants were asked to
generate a list of items (new names for products, names of
places beginning with a certain letter, things one can do with a
brick), and three conditions were compared. In the immediate
condition (i.e., the baseline condition) participants started right
after receiving the instruction. In the conscious thought condi-
tion, participants were given three minutes to consciously think
about the items before they were given time to list them. In
the unconscious thought condition, people were first given the
instruction, and were then distracted for three minutes before
they were given the opportunity to list the items. Conscious
thought led to more accessible items and to items in line with
a cue, whereas unconscious thought led to more inaccessible
items and to items diverging from the cue. Moreover, unconscious
thought led to more creative and unusual items than conscious
thought. In all experiments, unconscious thinkers also differed
significantly from participants who were not given time to think
at all. These findings suggest that whereas conscious thought may
be focused and convergent, unconscious thought may be more
associative and divergent. Ritter et al. (2012b) investigated the
role of unconscious thought for both idea generation and idea
selection. Participants generated creative ideas immediately, after
conscious thought, or after a period of unconscious thought.
After having listed their ideas, participants selected their most
creative idea. Performance in idea generation was similar between
conscious and unconscious thought; however, individuals who
had unconsciously thought about ideas were better in selecting
their most creative idea. These findings are in support of the
idea that unconscious processes actively contribute to creativity,
as it is unlikely that these findings are the consequence of set-
shifting or relaxation. During task instruction no examples were
provided and no hints or cues were given, meaning that no
fixating elements or specific mental sets were induced that could
have become less accessible, changed, or forgotten altogether
during a period of distraction. Recovering from fatigue is also
unlikely to account for the current findings, as incubation effects
also occurred in the study when a cognitively demanding task (n-
back task) was used as distracter task (Dijksterhuis and Meurs,
2006).
Zhong et al. (2008) investigated the effect of unconscious
thought on the ability to find remote associations, as measured by
the RAT. Participants were presented difficult RAT triads (selected
from Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003). Afterwards, participants
in the conscious thought condition were told that they had 5 min
to think about these triads, and during this time, they were shown
the screen containing all triads, but were not allowed to write
down notes or answers. Participants in the unconscious-thought
condition were told that they would engage in an unrelated task
before returning to the word task. Participants in the distraction
condition were told that they had finished the task and would
move on to unrelated tasks. To prevent conscious thought about
the RAT items in the unconscious thought and mere distraction
conditions participants completed a 2-back task for 5 min (see
Dijksterhuis (2004)). After 5 min of conscious thought or dis-
traction, all participants engaged in a lexical decision task (Bargh
et al., 1995). Strings of letters appeared on the center of the
screen, and participants indicated whether or not each string
constituted an English word by pressing one of two buttons. The
letter strings included the RAT answers plus control words. After
completing the lexical decision task, participants in all three con-
ditions were again shown the RAT items and were asked to report
their answers. In the current research two separate outcomes of
the RAT test were assessed: implicit accessibility of correct RAT
answers (i.e., mental accessibility of RAT answers, as measured by
a lexical decision task) versus expression of those correct answers
(Wegner and Smart, 1997). A period of incubation, compared
with the same duration of conscious thought, did not increase the
reporting of correct answers. The results on accessibility, however,
revealed a striking difference: Unconscious thought, compared
with conscious thought and mere distraction, increased the men-
tal accessibility of RAT answers. These results are consistent with
unconscious thought theory, which systematically differentiates
conscious and unconscious thought processes, and suggest that
unconscious processing is more adept at associating and integrat-
ing information than conscious processing is (Dijksterhuis and
Nordgren, 2006). Importantly, in the unconscious-thought con-
dition the level of activation of RAT answers was higher than in
the mere-distraction condition, which suggests that the increased
accessibility after unconscious thought was not due to relaxation,
forgetting or the release of incorrect associations (i.e., “mental
set-shifting”). These findings indicate that unconscious processes
may actively facilitate the discovery of remote associations, an
important mental skill underlying creative thinking, and may
contribute to divergent thinking.
Yang et al. (2012) investigated under what conditions uncon-
scious thought can outperform conscious thought on creativity
tasks. Their results demonstrated that unconscious thought did
not provide creative advantage over conscious thought when
deliberation duration was either short or long (1 or 5 min,
respectively). However, when deliberation duration was of a mod-
erate length (3 min), the creative output of unconscious thought
exceeded that of conscious thought. These findings suggest that
the duration of unconscious thought has an inverted-U shaped
relationship with creativity. However, as different tasks require
different amounts of mental effort, the appropriate duration of
a moderate length can be assumed to be task dependent. In
line with these findings, a meta-analysis on unconscious thought
effects on decision-making (Strick et al., 2011) has shown that
unconscious thought effects are larger with moderate uncon-
scious thought intervals. Moreover, unconscious thought effects
in decision-making have been shown to be larger when a task is
used that does not require much processing capacity, that is, a
relatively undemanding task. Similarly, Sio and Ormerod’s (2009)
statistical meta-analytic review of incubation effects revealed that
the benefits of an incubation period are greater when participants
are occupied by an undemanding task than when they engage in
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either a demanding task or no task at all (Sio and Ormerod, 2009).
Moreover, Ellwood et al. (2009) demonstrated that the type of
break during the incubation period effects later solutions. As the
functional fixedness theory as well as the general fatigue theory
predict that a break, independent of its content, should be equally
effective in producing an incubation effect, these findings suggest
that systematic effects beyond relief from functional fixedness or
general fatigue are at play.
Gallate et al. (2012) and Ritter et al. (2012b) investigated
whether one can manipulate unconscious thought processes. In
the study from Gallate et al., participants were either aware
or unaware that they would soon be returning to a divergent
thinking task. During the break period, all participants were
distracted from the task (they did an arithmetic task), ensur-
ing that any ongoing problem solving was not conscious, but
unconscious. Immediately after finishing the arithmetic task, par-
ticipants returned to the divergent thinking task. Participants in
the aware condition had significantly higher post-break creativity
scores than those in the unaware condition. Ritter et al. (2012a)
investigate whether one can actively enhance the beneficial effect
of sleep on creativity by covertly reactivating the creativity task
during sleep. Individuals’ creative performance was compared
after three different conditions: sleep-with-conditioned-odor;
sleep-with-control- odor; or sleep-with-no-odor. In the evening
prior to sleep, all participants were presented with a problem that
required a creative solution. In the two odor conditions, a hidden
scent-diffuser spread an odor while the problem was presented.
In the sleep-with-conditioned-odor condition, task reactivation
during sleep was induced by means of the odor that was also
presented while participants were informed about the problem. In
the sleep-with-control-odor condition, participants were exposed
to a different odor during sleep than the one diffused during
problem presentation. In the no odor condition, no odor was
presented. After a night of sleep with the conditioned odor, par-
ticipants were found to be more creative and better able to select
their most creative idea than participants who had been exposed
to a control odor or no odor while sleeping. Task reactivation
during sleep seems to actively trigger creativity-related processes
during sleep. These findings give a first indication that one can
manipulate unconscious thought processes and, thereby, facilitate
creative performance.
The idea that unconscious processes work on a problem in the
absence of conscious guidance has been described by many great
artists and thinkers, and the above mentioned findings provide
first scientific evidence for the idea that a period of incuba-
tion benefits from unconscious processes. This may be related
to the fact that unconscious thought organizes information.
Representations become better organized and more polarized,
and memory becomes more gist-based. Moreover, unconscious
thought theory postulates that unconscious thought leads to a
process of weighting whereby the importance of information
is assessed. However, this idea awaits further study, as it was
supported in some experiments (Bos et al., 2011; Usher et al.,
2011), but not in others (Ashby et al., 2011; Pachur and Forrer,
2013). These findings may suggest that unconscious thought is
a process whereby disorganized information becomes more and
more organized until some kind of equilibrium is reached, and
the conclusions can be transferred to consciousness. Recently,
the first neuroscientific evidence into unconscious thought was
provided. As in earlier studies on unconscious thought and
decision-making, Creswell et al. (2013) showed that uncon-
scious thinkers made better decisions than conscious thinkers
and than immediate decision makers. Moreover, their fMRI
data demonstrated that participants who thought unconsciously
while doing a distraction task showed more activity in the right
DLPFC and left intermediate visual cortex than participants who
merely performed the same distraction task. These areas were
already involved in the initial encoding of the information in
the first place, and the authors proposed a “neural reactivation
account” for unconscious thought, indeed demonstrating uncon-
scious processing to continue after encoding. Importantly, neural
reactivation in the right DLPFC and left intermediate visual
cortex was predictive of decision quality of unconscious thinkers.
Further neuroscientific research on creativity and incubation
should investigate brain activity during incubation to shed fur-
ther light on the underlying cognitive mechanisms of incubation
effects.
To conclude, several studies suggest that it is not merely the
absence of conscious thought that drives creativity, but that dur-
ing an incubation period unconscious processes can contribute to
creative thinking. Often, it takes time to come up with creative
ideas and solutions. It is reasonable to assume that most thought
processes underlying creative thought are neither fully conscious
nor fully unconscious. Instead, prolonged creative thought pro-
cesses may have both conscious and unconscious elements, and
conscious and unconscious thought may alternate. You think
about a problem consciously, you get stuck and perform another
task, you think some more, you sleep on it for a while, you
then think a bit more after you’ve encountered relevant new
information, et cetera.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Previous studies have shown that creativity training can enhance
everyday creative performance (e.g., Scott et al., 2004), and many
tactics have been identified to facilitate creative thinking skills,
such as set-shifting, questioning assumptions, and using analogies
(i.e., finding correspondence of inner relationship or function
between different concepts). The application of unconscious
processes, however, has not been systematically introduced to
educational, innovation and business contexts. By demonstrat-
ing that unconscious processes can be important for creativity,
the current findings may encourage practitioners to use uncon-
scious processes in order to enhance creative thinking. Applying
unconscious processes could, for example, entail that people
set a goal to find creative solutions for a problem before they
are distracted from the problem by doing something different.
What people do in the meantime should be chosen carefully.
Sio and Ormerod’s (2009) meta-analytic review revealed that the
benefits of an incubation period are greater when participants are
occupied by an undemanding task than when they engage in a
demanding task or no task at all. Moreover, Gilhooly et al. (2013)
found that spatial incubation benefited verbal-rated creativity,
and verbal incubation benefited spatial-rated creativity but not
vice versa. Therefore, when stuck on a creative task, during an
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incubation period one should do something undemanding that
is very different from the main task, before returning to it.
Although unconscious processes can be a powerful source to
facilitate creativity, only engage in daydreaming or sleeping to
produce groundbreaking discoveries or great artistic creations will
not do the trick. A plethora of raw materials has to be available to
be connected and one has to be able to focus on some options
out of an array of options. In this sense, conscious processing is
needed to establish a knowledge base, to know what problems to
tackle, and to verify and implement new ideas. Future research
may investigate what combination of conscious and unconscious
processes is most fruitful for creativity. One could think about
the order of the two processes (e.g., a period of task-related
conscious thought that is followed by a period during which one
refrains from task-related conscious thought, or repeatedly switch
between the two modes of thought), and the optimal duration
of each of the two processes. People are likely to benefit more
from an incubation period when they get stuck and, therefore,
one can assume that a relatively long period of conscious thought
should be preferred above a short period of conscious thought.
Also for unconscious processes the duration of the incubation
period seems to be of importance. In a recent study from Yang
et al. (2012), 3 min (as compared to 1 min and 5 min) seemed
to be the optimal duration of unconscious thought. However, it
is likely that 3 min of incubation is not the most appropriate
duration for all creativity tasks. It can be assumed that the optimal
duration is contingent on the task (Weisberg, 1999). Besides
exploring the optimal duration of unconscious processes as a
function of task characteristics and the optimal combination of
conscious and unconscious processes, future research could also
focus on the similarities and disparities between the different
unconscious processes (i.e., incubation, unconscious thought,
mind-wandering and sleep) and could investigate which process is
most beneficial for creativity and for the distinct mental processes
underlying creative thought (Baer, 1998). Finally, future research
may study potential moderators, for example, whether experts
and people with ample prior knowledge exhibit a different pattern
of creative performance as a result of unconscious and conscious
processes.
The present article aimed to provide an overview of the
domain of incubation and creativity, and to shed more light on
the causes of incubation effects. Research on incubation, mind
wandering, and sleep was presented and discussed, and it was
investigated whether people can think unconsciously and whether
unconscious processes can contribute to creativity. The current
findings provide first empirical support for the idea that during
an incubation period unconscious processes contribute to creative
thinking, and that it is not merely the absence of conscious
thought that drives incubation effects. We hope that the current
article inspires researchers to further tackle the unconscious foun-
dations of creativity. This will not only increase our theoretical
knowledge on the role of unconscious processes in creativity, but
will also offer valuable insights for practical implication. Under-
standing and facilitating creativity is important, as the ability to
think creatively plays an important role in many areas of our life,
such as education, arts, sciences, and the economic sector.
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